🔐 Security-First Architecture¶

🛡️ Introduction to Security-First Thinking in ConnectSoft¶

In ConnectSoft, security is not an afterthought or a compliance checkbox — it is a design-first constraint, embedded into every layer of the AI Software Factory. From blueprint to agent, from microservice to orchestrator, security-first architecture ensures that every generated artifact is safe to operate, traceable, tenant-isolated, and governance-compliant.

“If it’s not secure by default — it doesn’t ship.”

Security in ConnectSoft is enforced not by manual reviews, but by automated agents, validators, template policies, and runtime contracts that make every service secure by construction.

🎯 Core Goals of Security-First Design¶

Goal	What It Ensures
✅ Default Deny	All external and internal access is denied unless explicitly allowed
✅ Least Privilege	Every agent, service, and job has the minimal permissions required
✅ Multi-Tenant Isolation	No cross-tenant data, config, or events allowed
✅ Secrets Protection	No hardcoded secrets or unscoped config allowed
✅ Observability & Auditing	All security events are emitted, traced, and versioned

🧠 Security-First at Every Phase¶

Phase	Security Enforcement
Blueprint	Declares scopes, trust boundaries, edition-specific features
Template	Includes security guards, auth patterns, tenant enforcement
Agent Skill	Skill scope must match declared access policy (e.g., `skillId: EmitSecureEndpoint`)
CI/CD	No promotion without security validation
Runtime	Traffic, identity, secrets, and storage are all policy-guarded
Studio	Every action traceable; RBAC and audit logs enforced

📦 What Security-First Affects¶

Layer	Example
API	OAuth2, token scopes, rate limits, tenant claim validation
Domain	Role-aware commands, scoped aggregates, secure events
Infrastructure	mTLS, network policy, secret rotation, non-root containers
Orchestration	Agent execution scope and traceId validation
Studio & UI	RBAC, audit history, tenant isolation
Delivery	Secure pipelines, sigstore integration, GitOps policy guards

🔐 Security as a Factory Constraint¶

Security-first means:

🔒 Agents cannot emit unscoped skills (e.g., modify config outside their trace)
🔐 Templates validate context, scopes, and role bindings before generation
🛡️ Every artifact (code, infra, contract) contains a security profile
🧾 Every service produces signed traces and audit events

✅ Summary¶

ConnectSoft uses Security-First Architecture as a default stance for every generated service, API, blueprint, and agent flow
Security is enforced at design time, generation time, and runtime — not retrofitted
This mindset supports multi-tenant SaaS, agent autonomy, and audit-grade governance

🧠 Threat Modeling in a Multi-Agent SaaS Factory¶

In a traditional app, threat modeling is often a manual process applied post-design. In ConnectSoft, threat modeling is embedded in the platform — driven by structured blueprints, trust-boundary declarations, agent skill scopes, and runtime contracts.

“Every module has a trust model — and every agent must operate within it.”

This section introduces how threats are pre-modeled, roles are scoped, and risks are mitigated by agents, templates, and validators automatically during code and system generation.

⚔️ What Makes Threat Modeling Critical in ConnectSoft¶

Risk Category	Examples in a Multi-Agent Factory
Cross-tenant leakage	An agent emits code that processes or logs tenant data from another trace
Privilege escalation	A skill modifies infrastructure it wasn’t scoped to
Blueprint injection	A manipulated blueprint tries to emit unsafe routes, secrets, or storage policies
Improper trust assignment	One context trusts data from another without validation
Missing validation	Agent-generated handler lacks auth, rate limiting, or claims verification

✅ ConnectSoft prevents these threats at generation time — not just at runtime.

🧩 Threat Modeling Vocabulary in ConnectSoft¶

Concept	Description
Trust Boundary	Declared boundary (e.g., external client → public API → internal handler)
Sensitive Field	Blueprint-declared fields flagged as `pii`, `secret`, or `internal-only`
Role Scope	Who/what is allowed to perform which action (e.g., `agent:api-designer` can’t emit secrets)
Execution Trace	Links every agent action to an authorized origin blueprint and user/project/tenant
Surface Risk Score	Risk level assigned to a service/API based on exposure and capabilities

📘 Blueprint Threat Modeling Fields Example¶

api:
  public: true
  auth: oauth2
  trustBoundary: external
fields:
  - name: customerEmail
    type: string
    sensitivity: pii
  - name: sessionToken
    type: string
    sensitivity: secret
security:
  requiredRoles: [admin]
  riskScore: high

→ Affects:

API gateway config
Auth guard generation
Masking and encryption logic
Secrets injection and redaction
Agent skill validation scopes

🔍 Threat Modeling Checks in Codegen¶

Check	Enforced By
Handler processing `pii` → must mask in logs	`Backend Developer Agent` + `Security Validator`
Blueprint exposes public API → must use OAuth2 + rate limit	`API Designer Agent` + `Gateway Policy Injector`
Agent skill scope ≠ blueprint role	Blocked in orchestrator pre-execution
External trust boundary → must validate payload schema	`SchemaValidatorAgent`
Tenant-scoped skill targets non-tenant data	Rejected with `CrossContextExecutionBlocked` event

🔒 Trust Boundaries in Templates¶

Every template declares its trust boundary, used by:

✅ Coordinators (to order agent steps safely)
✅ Observability layer (to flag unexpected transitions)
✅ Skill planner (to avoid unsafe composition)
✅ Blueprint linter (to reject insecure field access)

🧪 Threat Simulation and Feedback¶

Studio and tests simulate:

Unsafe trace replay
Untrusted input injection
Agent role escalation attempts
Scope violations (e.g., writing secrets outside assigned vault)
Blueprint mutation detection

→ Results in security audit events and ThreatModelValidationFailed signals.

✅ Summary¶

ConnectSoft integrates real-time, blueprint-driven threat modeling directly into the software generation lifecycle
Agents, validators, and orchestrators operate within declared trust boundaries, role scopes, and data sensitivity contracts
This ensures the platform is not just secure — it’s resilient against architectural missteps and design-level threats

🆔 Identity and Access Management for Agents and Services¶

ConnectSoft enforces granular identity and access control across all layers of the platform — from blueprint execution to runtime service-to-service calls. Every agent, user, service, and pipeline action is associated with a traceable identity and is granted only minimum required privileges.

“If it has no identity, it can’t act. If it has no scope, it can’t overreach.”

This section explains how ConnectSoft secures its ecosystem using identity-first execution, scoped tokens, and policy-bound roles.

🔐 Identity Layers in ConnectSoft¶

Identity Type	Use Case
Agent Identity (`agentId`)	Ties every agent skill execution to a specific persona, scope, and skill set
Service Identity	Kubernetes workload identity / Azure AD / IAM role used by pods
User Identity	Used in Studio for project, tenant, and release operations
Execution Identity	Derived from blueprint + CI context, used for traceable pipelines
Token Identity	JWTs / OAuth2 tokens passed in service calls or agent prompts

Each identity is versioned, logged, and used in audit trails, access control, and event attribution.

🧩 Identity Flow in an Execution Trace¶

sequenceDiagram
  participant StudioUser
  participant Orchestrator
  participant BackendDeveloperAgent
  participant BookingService

  StudioUser->>Orchestrator: Submit Blueprint (userId: u-123)
  Orchestrator->>BackendDeveloperAgent: Execute Skill (agentId: backend-developer)
  BackendDeveloperAgent->>BookingService: Emit handler (serviceIdentity: svc-booking)

Hold "Alt" / "Option" to enable pan & zoom

→ All identity claims are persisted in the execution-metadata.json and linked to traceId.

📘 Blueprint IAM Example¶

iam:
  serviceIdentity: connectsoft-svc-booking
  agentScopes:
    - skill: GenerateHandler
      requiredRole: backend-developer
    - skill: EmitDomainEvent
      requiredRole: domain-modeler
  requiredAuth:
    strategy: oauth2
    scopes: [booking.write, appointment.manage]

→ Enforced by:

Agent skill planner
API gateway configuration
CI/CD step validators
Studio RBAC engine

🧠 IAM Features by Layer¶

Layer	Enforcement
Agent Layer	Skills are executed only if `agentId + skillId` match declared role
API Layer	OAuth2 + JWT auth enforced; `scopes[]` matched to endpoint
Service Layer	Workload identity used for downstream requests and secret access
CI/CD Layer	Token-based pipeline execution identity; signed commits and actions
Studio	Role-bound UI and API permissions (e.g., `security-architect` vs `qa-engineer`)

🧾 Identity Validation in Code Generation¶

Check	Validator
Agent tries to emit skill outside scope	`SkillScopeValidator`
Missing service identity in deployment	`ServiceManifestLinter`
Endpoint exposes sensitive data but lacks scope	`ApiContractSecurityValidator`
JWT lacks required claims or issuer	`AuthMiddlewareTemplate`
Secret accessed without workload identity	`InfraGuardPolicyAgent`

🔒 Identity-First CI/CD¶

Each release run has a pipeline identity
All infra changes are signed with identity metadata
Agent execution scopes can be restricted by identity (e.g., agent-x cannot run EmitSecrets)
Pipeline impersonation is blocked unless explicitly authorized

📊 Studio Identity Features¶

Identity viewer per trace
Token validator UI
RBAC role assignment and audit history
Cross-identity event explorer (who did what, where, and why)

✅ Summary¶

ConnectSoft enforces strong, scoped identity controls across agents, services, and platform components
Every action is tied to an identity, limited by a scope, and validated via policy before execution
This provides fine-grained auditability, least privilege enforcement, and support for Zero Trust communication

🧱 Zero Trust: Mutual Auth, mTLS, and Isolation¶

ConnectSoft is built on Zero Trust principles, meaning no component trusts another by default — not even inside the same namespace, tenant, or service mesh. Identity, encryption, authorization, and network boundaries are strictly enforced by agent-generated templates, orchestrators, and runtime policies.

“In ConnectSoft, every connection is earned — not assumed.”

This section explains how Zero Trust is operationalized using mutual TLS (mTLS), sidecar proxies, signed identities, and access policies across modules, tenants, and environments.

🧠 What Zero Trust Means in ConnectSoft¶

Principle	Implementation
Explicit Identity	All services have workload identity, agent ID, or trace ID
Mutual Authentication	Services use mTLS or signed tokens to verify each other
Least Access	Policies restrict who/what can reach each resource
Segmentation	Network policy isolates services by tenant or context
Continuous Validation	Identities, claims, and config are re-evaluated at runtime

📘 Zero Trust Configuration in Blueprint¶

security:
  zeroTrust: true
  networkPolicy:
    denyAll: true
    allow:
      - from: BookingService
        to: NotificationService
        protocol: https
        tenantScoped: true
  serviceIdentity: connectsoft-svc-booking
  mTLS: true

→ Triggers:

mTLS injection (e.g., Istio, Linkerd)
Signed workload identity with cloud provider (Azure AD, IAM)
K8s NetworkPolicy.yaml
YARP/Envoy proxy configuration
API contract annotation (aud, iss, sub claims enforced)

🧩 Zero Trust Across Layers¶

Layer	Enforcement
Service-to-Service	Sidecar proxies enforce mTLS and allow-list policies
Agent-to-Service	Agent skill runs with `agentId + traceId + scope`
API Gateway	Rejects unauthenticated calls, enforces OAuth2 + rate limits
Infrastructure	Secrets mounted only if identity matches policy
CI/CD	Identity tokens used for all deployment and pipeline steps

🔐 Mutual TLS (mTLS)¶

mTLS is enabled by default via service mesh
Certificate issuance handled by mesh control plane or SPIRE
SANs include serviceId, tenantId, and environment
Proxies validate incoming cert before routing to app

Supported Meshes:

✅ Istio
✅ Linkerd
✅ Consul
✅ YARP (embedded mutual auth policies)

🤖 Agent Skills for Zero Trust¶

Agent	Skills
`Infrastructure Engineer Agent`	`EmitMTLSPolicy`, `GenerateNetworkPolicyYaml`, `AttachMeshIdentity`
`Security Architect Agent`	`DefineTrustBoundaries`, `ValidateServiceAuthFlows`, `ScanPolicyViolations`
`DevOps Engineer Agent`	`InjectServiceIdentityClaims`, `SecureTrafficWithSidecarProxy`
`Observability Engineer Agent`	`TraceZeroTrustViolations`, `ReportInvalidTrustTransitions`

🧪 Validation & Runtime Guarantees¶

Unauthorized service call → blocked by mesh
mTLS handshake failure → connection refused
Missing tenantId or aud → API returns 403
Unauthorized secret mount → SecretAccessDenied event emitted
Studio maps all allowed routes with visual trust topology

📊 Studio Views¶

Zero Trust topology map
Recent trust violations (e.g., dropped request due to cert mismatch)
Signed identity viewer (JWT or SPIFFE)
Per-tenant trust scope dashboard
Network policy diff tools

✅ Summary¶

ConnectSoft enforces Zero Trust as a default — every agent, service, and request must prove its identity and be explicitly allowed
mTLS, workload identity, and network segmentation are automatically generated and applied at runtime
This ensures the platform is resilient, multi-tenant safe, and zero-trust compliant by design

🏢 Tenant-Aware Access Control¶

ConnectSoft is a multi-tenant platform by design — and tenant-aware access control is a core part of its security architecture. Every agent, service, API, and infrastructure resource is scoped by tenantId, and access to data, configuration, and functionality is strictly isolated across tenant boundaries.

“If it doesn’t belong to your tenant, you can’t see it, touch it, or even know it exists.”

This section describes how ConnectSoft enforces tenant isolation across all layers: from blueprint to runtime.

🧠 Tenant Isolation Principles¶

Principle	Enforcement
Tenant ID required	All services, agents, and APIs operate with an explicit `tenantId`
No cross-tenant data access	Queries, repositories, and APIs filter by `tenantId` at the root
Secrets and config scoped per tenant	No shared secrets or unscoped values allowed
Runtime execution isolated per tenant	Pods, agents, queues, and workloads tagged and optionally namespaced
Auditing and logging separated by tenant	No mixed logs or trace contamination

📘 Blueprint Example: Tenant Access Control Block¶

tenant:
  id: vetclinic-001
  isolation:
    databaseSchema: true
    queues: true
    runtimeNamespace: true
  accessControl:
    allowedRoles:
      - admin
      - billing-manager
  edition: premium

→ Affects:

Repository filters and NHibernate criteria
API route guards
Configuration injection
K8s namespace placement
Role-to-scope bindings

🧩 Tenant-Aware Design Across Layers¶

Layer	Enforcement Mechanism
Domain/Application	Repositories filter every access by `tenantId`; commands require `tenantContext`
API	`tenantId` extracted from token claims or headers; unauthorized tenants return `403`
Infrastructure	Secrets, config maps, databases scoped by `tenantId`; queues have per-tenant bindings
Runtime	Optional per-tenant Kubernetes namespace or label-based segregation
Agent Flows	Each `traceId` is tied to a single `tenantId` and enforced by orchestrators

🔐 Enforcement in Templates¶

Every repository includes a required tenantId parameter in method signatures
tenantId is injected automatically by middleware or orchestration layer
API gateways route based on tenant-aware domain patterns ({tenant}.connectsoft.app)
Config and secrets lookup is fully tenant-qualified
Agents cannot execute skills for tenants outside their assigned trace context

🤖 Agent Skills for Enforcement¶

Agent	Skills
`Backend Developer Agent`	`InjectTenantFilterToRepo`, `AddTenantValidationMiddleware`
`Infrastructure Engineer Agent`	`EmitTenantScopedSecrets`, `DeployToTenantNamespace`
`Security Architect Agent`	`ValidateCrossTenantBarriers`, `EmitTenantAccessMatrix`
`DevOps Engineer Agent`	`BindTenantToRuntimeEnv`, `GenerateTenantK8sPolicy`

🧪 Tests and Validation¶

TestGenerator emits tenant-specific test cases
Attempts to access another tenant’s data trigger TenantAccessViolation
Blueprint validation checks for missing tenantId or ambiguous context
Cross-tenant HTTP requests return 403 or 401 with audit logging

📊 Studio Tenant Access Tools¶

Per-tenant trace explorer
Config and secret viewer scoped to tenant
Access Control Matrix: role → scope → module
Tenant boundary diff visualization
Security alert stream for tenant breach attempts

✅ Summary¶

ConnectSoft enforces strict tenant-aware access control across all services, agents, and flows
Every interaction is scoped by tenantId, ensuring isolation, security, and compliance
Agent generation, API execution, and orchestration are contextualized per tenant by default

🔐 API Security: OAuth2, Scopes, and Tokens¶

In ConnectSoft, all public and internal APIs are secured using OAuth2-based access control, with strict enforcement of token validation, role-based scopes, and tenant-aware claims. This ensures that every API call is authenticated, authorized, scoped, and traceable — whether it’s made by a user, a service, or an agent.

“An API is not exposed unless it’s protected — and every token must prove its right to act.”

This section details how ConnectSoft applies security-first principles to API generation and gateway behavior.

🧠 Core API Security Features¶

Feature	Purpose
OAuth2 tokens	All public APIs require access tokens (JWT, opaque, or introspected)
Scope-based authorization	Endpoints require explicit scopes like `booking.read` or `billing.admin`
Claims-based tenant resolution	`tenantId`, `role`, and `userId` must be extracted from token
Signature validation	JWTs are signed and verified using discovery endpoint / JWKS
API versioning and context isolation	Tokens must match the right version + tenant module

📘 Blueprint API Security Example¶

api:
  public: true
  auth:
    strategy: oauth2
    provider: azure-ad
    scopes:
      - booking.read
      - appointment.write
    claimMapping:
      tenantId: tid
      userId: sub
      role: roles
  gateway:
    rateLimit: 100/min
    cors: true

→ Generates:

OAuth2 middleware
Gateway route protection
Role guard decorators
Token introspection or JWKS verification
Swagger securityScheme for bearer tokens

🧩 Security Enforcement in API Templates¶

Element	Enforcement
Controllers	`[Authorize(Policy = "booking.read")]`
Gateway	Route only allows traffic with valid token and required scopes
Middleware	Extract claims and reject if missing `tenantId`
Swagger/OpenAPI	Includes `security: [bearerAuth: []]`
Runtime	Unauthorized requests → `401`; forbidden → `403`

🤖 Agent Skills Involved¶

Agent	Skills
`API Designer Agent`	`GenerateSecuredRoute`, `EmitOpenApiSecurityDefinitions`
`Security Architect Agent`	`DefineOAuthPolicies`, `MapScopesToRoles`, `GenerateTokenValidationLogic`
`DevOps Engineer Agent`	`InjectIdentityProviderConfig`, `EmitJWKSDiscovery`
`Infrastructure Engineer Agent`	`ConfigureGatewayOAuthHeaders`, `ValidateTokenInjection`

🔒 Supported Identity Providers¶

Provider	Method
Azure AD / Entra ID	OpenID Connect with Microsoft identity platform
Auth0 / Okta / Keycloak	OIDC or token introspection
Internal ConnectSoft Auth	Agent-generated authorization server with role/tenant/scopes

🧪 Validation & Test Coverage¶

Agent-generated tests for:
Valid token → 200
Missing token → 401
Invalid scope → 403
Token structure linting (issuer, audience, expiration)
Rejection of unsigned or malformed tokens
Swagger security validator emits MissingSecurityBlock if not declared

📊 Studio Security Insights¶

Token introspection viewer
Per-endpoint scope map
JWT decoder and structure validator
Role-to-scope assignment viewer
Gateway rejection logs by module and tenant

✅ Summary¶

API Security in ConnectSoft is OAuth2-driven, scope-bound, and claim-enforced
Every endpoint and gateway rule is generated with secure defaults and multi-tenant safeguards
This guarantees that only authorized, authenticated actors can interact with platform services

🔑 Secrets Management and Rotation¶

In ConnectSoft, no secret is ever hardcoded, committed, or stored in an image. Secrets are managed through cloud-native secret providers, injected securely at runtime, and scoped per tenant, module, and environment. The platform also supports automatic secret rotation, audit tracking, and usage validation — all enforced by agent-generated policies.

“If a service can’t run without knowing a secret — it can’t run unless the factory approves that secret.”

This section outlines how ConnectSoft handles secrets securely and automatically, ensuring zero trust, tenant safety, and environment integrity.

🧠 Core Principles for Secrets¶

Principle	Implementation
✅ No hardcoded values	Secrets are never placed in config files, source code, or Dockerfiles
✅ External secret providers	Azure Key Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, GCP Secret Manager supported
✅ Scoped injection	Secrets are mounted per tenant/module/environment
✅ Read-only access	Services can only access what they’re explicitly allowed
✅ Rotation ready	All secrets are versioned, and reloading is supported via reloadable config providers

📘 Blueprint Secrets Example¶

secrets:
  provider: azure-keyvault
  items:
    - name: BookingDbPassword
      scope: module
      requiredBy:
        - BookingService
    - name: NotificationApiKey
      scope: tenant
      requiredBy:
        - NotificationWorker
  rotationPolicy:
    enabled: true
    intervalDays: 30
    alertOnExpiry: true

→ Triggers:

Vault secret declarations
Secret reference bindings in deployment.yaml or Bicep
Appsettings override with secret placeholder
Rotation watcher config (optional cron job or event trigger)

🧩 Secret Flow by Layer¶

Layer	Behavior
Infrastructure	Secrets are created/stored via Bicep, Terraform, or SDK
Deployment	Secrets injected via volume mounts or `envVars` (never inline)
Runtime	Services use secret-aware config providers (e.g., Azure.Extensions.Configuration.Secrets)
CI/CD	Pipelines pull secrets securely from vault, never store them
Agents	Agent skills validate secret presence but never reveal values

🤖 Agent Contributions¶

Agent	Skills
`Infrastructure Engineer Agent`	`EmitSecretBindings`, `GenerateKeyVaultBicep`, `MapSecretsToConfig`
`DevOps Engineer Agent`	`AttachSecretsToDeployment`, `GenerateRotationPolicy`, `ValidateVaultPermissions`
`Security Architect Agent`	`ScanForHardcodedSecrets`, `GenerateSecretAccessAudit`

🔒 Rotation Support¶

Versioned secrets: old versions expire, new ones activated via CI event or schedule
Notification support: Studio emits SecretRotationRequired or SecretExpiringSoon
Zero-downtime updates: secret clients support refresh without restart
Agent can rotate secrets by emitting RotateSecretRequest

🧪 Validation and Safety Checks¶

Agent-generated tests ensure:
Secrets are injected before service starts
Placeholder resolution passes
No plaintext secrets in logs
Invalid access returns 403 or fails fast
Studio linter flags unscopedSecret, unboundSecret, and leakedSecretUsage

📊 Studio Tools¶

Secret registry per tenant and environment
Rotation calendar and history viewer
Access map: who can read what and when
Last accessed timestamp and audit log
Cross-reference: module → secret → usage graph

✅ Summary¶

Secrets in ConnectSoft are managed via external providers, never stored or logged
Every secret is scoped, validated, auditable, and rotation-ready
This approach protects sensitive data and ensures zero trust, zero exposure, and full traceability

🧱 Secure-by-Default Microservice Templates¶

In ConnectSoft, microservices are generated from opinionated, secure-by-default templates that embed security best practices into every layer — from code to container to infrastructure. These templates prevent common vulnerabilities, enforce least privilege, and ensure services are safe to deploy immediately after generation.

“The only code that gets shipped is the code that’s already secure.”

This section explains how ConnectSoft’s microservice templates are structured to minimize security risks by design, not by post-generation reviews.

🧠 What Secure-by-Default Means¶

Concern	Default Behavior
✅ Authentication & Authorization	Included by default for every route and command
✅ No open ports	Only required ports are exposed via service manifest
✅ Health & readiness checks	Generated with built-in probes to support autoscaling & security health
✅ No root execution	Containers run as non-root with read-only filesystems
✅ TLS and HTTPS enforced	All services use mTLS or gateway-enforced HTTPS
✅ Secrets externalized	No hardcoded config; uses environment-scoped injected secrets

📘 Secure Features in Template Example¶

template:
  type: microservice
  name: BookingService
  secureByDefault: true
  features:
    - authentication: enabled
    - authorization: role-based
    - mTLS: true
    - secretInjection: keyvault
    - runtime: container
    - logging: structured
    - tracing: openTelemetry
    - networkPolicy: deny-all-except-declared

→ Results in:

Secure controller scaffold ([Authorize] attributes, scoped endpoint decorators)
Vault-backed config with placeholder expansion
K8s manifest includes runAsNonRoot, readOnlyRootFilesystem, and liveness probes
Envoy/YARP config for mTLS with identity-based routing

🧩 Secure Defaults by Layer¶

Layer	Secure Defaults
Domain	No sensitive logic outside authorized handlers
Application	Scoped access rules per command and query
Infrastructure	Tenant-scoped adapters, secrets by identity
API	OAuth2 auth middleware + scope decorators
CI/CD	Pipelines run with signed identities and scan outputs for violations
Docker/K8s	Read-only filesystem, minimal base images, mTLS labels and probes included

🤖 Agent Enforcement¶

Agent	Skills
`Backend Developer Agent`	`GenerateSecureHandler`, `InjectAuthorizationPolicy`, `EmitSafeDefaults`
`Infrastructure Engineer Agent`	`EmitK8sSecurityContext`, `AttachSecretRef`, `GenerateVaultMounts`
`Security Architect Agent`	`ValidateGeneratedArtifactSecurity`, `BlockInsecureTemplateVariant`
`Test Generator Agent`	`EmitAuthorizationTests`, `GenerateUnauthorizedAccessTests`

🧪 Secure-by-Default Test Coverage¶

403 for unauthorized users by default
401 for missing tokens
200 only with correct roles and claims
Health endpoint tests to validate readiness under probe configuration
Lint check: if secureByDefault = false → generation blocked by policy

📊 Studio Secure Template Audit¶

Template config viewer (toggle: secureByDefault)
Generated routes → authorization matrix
Policy scanner results per artifact
Secure container checklist report
CVE scanner integration for base images

✅ Summary¶

Every ConnectSoft microservice is generated with secure-by-default policies baked into its template
This includes authentication, authorization, secrets management, runtime hardening, and traffic isolation
These templates help ensure safe-by-construction microservices, minimizing post-deploy security gaps

🧠 Agent Execution Security & Skill Scoping¶

In ConnectSoft, every agent operates within a strict security boundary, and every skill execution is authorized, scoped, and traceable. Agents cannot “freely generate code” — they can only perform tasks they are authorized to run, within their assigned scope of responsibility, and against a valid execution trace.

“An agent is not a developer — it’s a secure, purpose-bound service.”

This section defines how ConnectSoft enforces skill-level authorization, agent identity policies, and execution trace validation to prevent escalation, overreach, or unauthorized actions.

🔐 Agent Execution Model¶

Element	Description
agentId	Globally unique agent identity (e.g., `frontend-developer`, `security-architect`)
skillId	Name of the specific action (e.g., `GenerateHandler`, `EmitSecrets`)
scope	What domains/modules/tenants this agent can operate on
traceId	The execution session tied to a blueprint and user intent
authorization policy	Declares which skills are permitted by which agents, under what conditions

📘 Agent Manifest Example¶

agent:
  id: backend-developer
  version: 1.4.0
  allowedSkills:
    - GenerateHandler
    - GenerateDTO
    - EmitCommandContract
    - EmitQueryContract
  restrictedSkills:
    - EmitSecrets
    - GenerateIAMPolicy
  allowedContexts:
    - modules: [BookingService, NotificationService]
    - tenants: [vetclinic-001]
    - environments: [dev, staging]

→ Enforced by orchestrators and skill validators before execution.

🧩 Security Controls for Agent Execution¶

Control	Behavior
Skill allowlist	Only explicitly permitted skills can be invoked
Context binding	Agents can only act within specified modules, tenants, or projects
Blueprint signature check	Ensures the blueprint was approved and not tampered
Trace validation	`traceId` must be active, match blueprint context, and not expired
Runtime audit log	Every execution emits a signed `AgentExecuted` event

🤖 Secure Agent Workflow¶

Orchestrator receives a valid trace and activates a skill
Skill registry checks if agentId is allowed to run skillId
Scope validator confirms context matches the current tenant/module
Execution begins, trace metadata injected
Completion recorded in execution-metadata.json and audit stream

🧠 Agent Skill Isolation in Practice¶

Agent	Allowed Skills	Denied
`QA Agent`	`GenerateSpecFlowTest`, `EmitAssertion`	❌ `EmitSecrets`, `DeployService`
`Frontend Developer Agent`	`GenerateComponent`, `CreateLayout`	❌ `AttachAPIRoute`, `ModifySecurityHeaders`
`Security Architect Agent`	`DefineAccessPolicy`, `ValidateEventContract`	❌ `WriteBusinessLogic`, `InjectClientScripts`

🧪 Enforcement and Testing¶

Attempting unauthorized skill triggers SkillNotPermitted event
Runtime rejects execution with 403 if trace scope mismatches
Orchestrator linter flags blueprints requesting invalid skills
Studio highlights “out-of-scope” agent requests before runtime
Canary execution used to validate agent role separation

📊 Studio & Audit Integration¶

Agent execution viewer (skills, trace, scope, timestamps)
Skill invocation heatmaps
Security alerts for:
- Unauthorized skill requests
- Escalated permissions
- Trace tampering
RBAC viewer: agent → skill → context map

✅ Summary¶

Every agent in ConnectSoft operates under strict execution security policies, limiting them to specific skills, tenants, and modules
This prevents unsafe generation, escalation, or misuse of blueprint access
All agent actions are traceable, auditable, and validated in real time

🧾 Role-Based Access Control in Studio & CI/CD¶

ConnectSoft enforces Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) across all interfaces — from the Studio UI and API, to the CI/CD pipelines, agent orchestration, and even within prompt-scope execution. Roles are fine-grained, tenant-aware, and action-scoped, ensuring every user or system actor only has access to what they’re entitled to.

“In the Software Factory, your role defines not just what you can see — but what agents can do on your behalf.”

This section outlines how RBAC is structured, enforced, and integrated into every interaction and artifact in the platform.

🧠 RBAC in ConnectSoft: Key Characteristics¶

Principle	Implementation
✅ Scope-bound roles	Roles are scoped to tenant, project, module, and environment
✅ Agent permission linkage	User or system role determines what agent skills can be triggered
✅ Immutable audit trails	Every permission check is recorded in a traceable event
✅ Least privilege by default	All roles are deny-first unless explicitly granted
✅ Declarative role definitions	Roles and permissions are defined in `rbac.yaml` or the Studio UI

📘 Example RBAC Definition¶

roles:
  - name: security-architect
    permissions:
      - define-access-policy
      - view-secrets-metadata
      - approve-release
    scope:
      tenants: [all]
      modules: [*]
      environments: [staging, production]

  - name: qa-engineer
    permissions:
      - view-tests
      - trigger-test-suite
    scope:
      modules: [BookingService]
      tenants: [vetclinic-001]
      environments: [dev]

→ Used by:

Studio UI access control
Agent execution gating
CI/CD permission scoping
API token issuance and refresh policies

🔒 RBAC Enforced Across:¶

Layer	Enforcement Point
Studio UI/API	Page rendering and API endpoints gated by role permissions
Orchestrators	Agent skill triggers filtered based on `userRole` + `executionScope`
Blueprint Submission	Only certain roles can submit or approve sensitive modules
Secrets and Vault Access	Roles control which keys can be listed, read, or rotated
CI/CD Pipelines	GitOps actions (deploy, rollback, promote) are role-gated

🤖 Agent-Side RBAC Enforcement¶

Agents cannot run sensitive skills unless role scope includes them
Skill manifests declare requiredRole, requiredScope
Unauthorized skill execution triggers RolePermissionDenied
Role-token mappings are used to scope prompt execution and output

🧪 RBAC Policy Testing¶

Declarative policy unit tests (e.g., assert user.role cannot view secrets)
Pipeline RBAC test gates: simulate low-privilege execution paths
Studio RBAC explorer: simulate user access per role
CI runs use identity tokens with scoped permissions for dry-run and deploy phases

📊 Studio Role Management UI¶

Assign/revoke roles per user/project/tenant
View inherited vs direct role mappings
View per-role permission graph
Export current role mappings to YAML or JSON
Change history audit log (RoleGranted, RoleRevoked, PrivilegeEscalationAttempt)

✅ Summary¶

RBAC in ConnectSoft is centralized, declarative, and enforced across Studio, pipelines, APIs, and agents
Roles govern not just visibility, but generation, approval, deployment, and secret access
This ensures platform-wide principle of least privilege, traceability, and security enforcement

📡 Security Event Emission & Audit Trails¶

In ConnectSoft, every privileged action, security-sensitive event, and identity transition is captured as a structured, signed, and traceable security event. These events form a complete audit trail, enabling observability, incident forensics, regulatory compliance, and behavioral anomaly detection.

“If it changes who can do what — or accesses something sensitive — it’s recorded.”

This section details how ConnectSoft emits and manages security telemetry, and how agents and services contribute to a unified auditable security graph.

🧠 What Is Logged as a Security Event?¶

Event Type	Description
Role changes	`RoleGranted`, `RoleRevoked`, `RoleEscalationAttempted`
Agent execution	`AgentExecuted`, `SkillDenied`, `ExecutionScopeMismatch`
Access control violations	`UnauthorizedAccess`, `CrossTenantAccessAttempted`, `SecretAccessBlocked`
Auth & identity	`TokenValidated`, `TokenRejected`, `AuthProviderChanged`
Secrets & config	`SecretRead`, `SecretRotated`, `UnscopedConfigAccess`
Release & deployment	`DeploymentApproved`, `ReleasePromoted`, `SecureConfigDriftDetected`

All events are timestamped, trace-linked, and contain contextual metadata for tenant, module, environment, user, and agent.

📘 Security Event Format¶

{
  "eventType": "SecretRead",
  "traceId": "abc-123",
  "agentId": "devops-engineer",
  "module": "BookingService",
  "tenantId": "vetclinic-001",
  "userId": "u-456",
  "timestamp": "2025-05-11T10:14:30Z",
  "source": "StudioAPI",
  "action": "read",
  "target": "keyvault:BookingDbPassword",
  "status": "success"
}

→ Stored in the event stream, searchable in Studio, and exportable for compliance.

📦 Emission Points by Layer¶

Layer	Emitted Events
Studio	UI-level role changes, user actions, access attempts
CI/CD	Promotion decisions, deployment approvals, secret injections
Agent Orchestrators	Skill executions, scope checks, trace lifecycle events
Microservices	Auth token validation, API access decisions, scope violations
Secrets & Infra	Key vault access, secret reads/writes/rotations

🤖 Agent Participation¶

Agent	Emitted Events
`Security Architect Agent`	`AccessPolicyUpdated`, `SecurityDriftDetected`, `PolicyEnforced`
`DevOps Engineer Agent`	`PipelinePrivilegeViolation`, `VaultAccessed`, `SecureConfigApplied`
`Studio Coordinator Agent`	`AgentExecutionRequested`, `ExecutionScopeValidated`, `UserRoleBound`

All agents automatically emit AgentExecuted and SkillEvaluated with trace and scope information.

🧪 Event Validation and Replay¶

Studio includes event diff tools for audit history
Events are cryptographically signed with execution fingerprint
Replay support: simulate trace replay with event stream injection
Compliance mode: emits hash chain and change journal
SIEM-compatible export (e.g., JSON, CSV, OpenTelemetry Events)

📊 Studio Audit Tools¶

Full audit log by:
- Tenant
- User
- Agent
- Module
- Environment
Event correlation graph (who did what, where, when, and why)
Search and filter by eventType, status, traceId, affectedObject
Exportable audit bundles for ISO/SOC2/HIPAA reviews
Anomaly alerts: unusual behavior, privilege escalations, repeated failures

✅ Summary¶

ConnectSoft generates full security audit trails across every layer — Studio, agents, services, infrastructure, and pipelines
Security events are structured, signed, traceable, and replayable
This enables compliance, incident forensics, and real-time detection of suspicious or unauthorized behavior

🧱 Runtime Hardening (readOnlyFS, non-root, egress limits)¶

In ConnectSoft, every containerized workload — agent, microservice, test runner, or orchestrator — is deployed with runtime security hardening controls. These controls minimize the blast radius of compromise and ensure workloads are safe, immutable, and network-constrained at runtime.

“If your container needs write access to root, it won’t run here.”

This cycle outlines how runtime isolation, immutability, and principle of least privilege are enforced in every deployment artifact via templates and agent policies.

🔐 Key Hardening Strategies¶

Strategy	Enforcement
✅ Non-root execution	All containers run as a non-root UID/GID by default
✅ Read-only root filesystem	`/` is mounted read-only unless explicitly required
✅ Minimal base image	Uses `distroless`, `alpine`, or slim variants with reduced surface area
✅ Egress restriction	Outbound traffic blocked unless explicitly whitelisted
✅ No privilege escalation	`allowPrivilegeEscalation: false` set on all workloads
✅ Capability drops	Linux capabilities reduced to minimal (e.g., drop `NET_RAW`, `SYS_ADMIN`)
✅ Liveness & readiness probes	Validate workload is healthy and restartable

📘 Template: Hardened K8s Deployment Snippet¶

securityContext:
  runAsNonRoot: true
  runAsUser: 10001
  readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
  allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
  capabilities:
    drop: ["ALL"]

→ Generated automatically by the Infrastructure Engineer Agent when secureByDefault: true is declared.

🧩 Applied Across Workload Types¶

Workload	Runtime Hardening Applied
Microservices	✅ Hardened by container security context and base image
Functions (FaaS)	✅ Packaged with distroless runtime; isolated context enforced
Agents	✅ Containerized, namespace-restricted, non-root
Background jobs	✅ Read-only, non-root, probe-wrapped
CI/CD steps	✅ Run in hardened runners; no shared volumes or host mounts

🤖 Agent Enforcement¶

Agent	Skills
`Infrastructure Engineer Agent`	`EmitSecurityContext`, `DropCapabilities`, `EnforceReadOnlyRootFS`
`Security Architect Agent`	`ScanRuntimePolicy`, `ValidateContainerHardening`, `ApplyEgressPolicy`
`DevOps Engineer Agent`	`PatchHelmWithSecurityDefaults`, `InjectProbes`, `RestrictIngressEgress`

🧪 Runtime Validation¶

Pod security context tests: validate all hardened fields are present
Egress tests: attempts to reach external hosts → DENIED unless allowlisted
Health probe simulation: test pod restart behavior under readiness failures
CVE scanners on base images and layers
Security policy drift detector (RuntimeSecurityPolicyChanged event)

📊 Studio Hardening Dashboards¶

Hardened status per module
Base image analysis (size, CVE count, version)
Pod runtime profiles (root, writable, privileged = ❌)
Egress destinations per workload
Compliance coverage (NIST, CIS Benchmarks, SOC2 controls)

✅ Summary¶

Every containerized workload in ConnectSoft is hardened by default
Templates and agents enforce non-root execution, read-only filesystems, no escalations, and network egress restrictions
These measures drastically reduce runtime risk and support compliance, reliability, and zero-trust enforcement

🔗 Dependency & Supply Chain Security¶

In ConnectSoft, security doesn’t stop at code generation — it extends into every package, library, artifact, and infrastructure dependency. The platform enforces strict supply chain controls to prevent dependency hijacking, unauthorized component injection, and untracked third-party usage.

“Every artifact is known. Every dependency is pinned. Every build is traceable.”

This section describes how ConnectSoft secures the software supply chain via lockfiles, Software Bill of Materials (SBOM), signature validation, and policy gates.

🧠 Supply Chain Attack Vectors Prevented¶

Attack Type	Mitigation
Malicious package injection	Lockfiles + signature verification + allowlists
Transitive dependency compromise	Automated SBOM scanning + known CVE monitoring
Unauthorized artifact tampering	Git-commit signing, image digest pinning
Pipeline poisoning	Signed builds + isolated runners + policy enforcement
License drift / legal violations	SBOM license checker + Studio violation flags

📘 Secure Blueprint Dependency Declaration¶

dependencies:
  - name: MassTransit
    version: 8.0.2
    source: nuget
    signed: true
  - name: Newtonsoft.Json
    version: 13.0.3
    source: nuget
  - name: InternalAnalyticsLib
    source: connectsoft-internal
    pinned: true
    signed: true
    sbomVerified: true

→ Affects codegen, validation, SBOM assembly, and build policy enforcement.

🔒 Key Supply Chain Security Strategies¶

Control	Description
✅ Lockfiles	Every project includes language-specific lockfiles (`*.lock`, `packages.config`, `Directory.Packages.props`)
✅ SBOM	All generated modules include a Software Bill of Materials in SPDX/CycloneDX format
✅ Signed packages	Only allow signed NuGet/npm packages where supported
✅ Allowlist enforcement	Agents block inclusion of disallowed packages or registries
✅ Git + artifact signing	Signed commits, container image digests, pipeline output hashes
✅ Dependency license tracking	License field validated per dependency in SBOM

📦 Generated Artifacts¶

sbom.json or sbom.spdx.json
nuget.lock, package-lock.json, or Directory.Packages.props
artifact-signature.json per build
dependency-scan-report.json with CVEs, license summary, and unknowns

🤖 Agent Enforcement¶

Agent	Skills
`Security Architect Agent`	`ValidateSBOM`, `CheckDependencyCVEs`, `ApplyPackagePolicy`
`DevOps Engineer Agent`	`InjectLockfiles`, `SignBuildArtifacts`, `EmitArtifactHash`
`Studio Release Bot`	`VerifySignedBuild`, `CheckLicensing`, `EnforceVersionPolicy`

🧪 Tests and Compliance¶

CVE scan per release pipeline (FailIfHighCVEs > 0)
License check: fail on GPL, unknown, or non-commercial packages
Version diff monitor: unexpected upgrade triggers alert
SBOM integrity verification (SHA256 of full structure)
Studio generates SupplyChainScore per module and release

📊 Studio Supply Chain Insights¶

Dependency graph visualizer
Package health + CVE map
License compatibility checker
SBOM diff viewer (between releases)
Alert stream: SupplyChainDriftDetected, UnsignedPackageIncluded, BuildSignatureMismatch

✅ Summary¶

ConnectSoft enforces strong supply chain security through lockfiles, SBOMs, signed artifacts, and policy enforcement
Every dependency is tracked, every build is fingerprinted, and every artifact is auditable
This approach ensures build integrity, license compliance, and vulnerability mitigation throughout the software lifecycle

🔐 Data Protection (PII Classification, Masking, Encryption)¶

ConnectSoft implements end-to-end data protection policies that ensure all personally identifiable information (PII) and sensitive fields are handled securely — from blueprint declaration to storage, transmission, logging, and exposure.

“If it’s sensitive, it’s declared, protected, masked, and audited — by default.”

This section explains how agents and templates enforce data sensitivity handling, including field classification, encryption policies, masking in logs, and secure access at runtime.

🧠 Data Protection Layers in ConnectSoft¶

Layer	Control Mechanism
Blueprint	Sensitivity metadata (e.g., `pii`, `secret`, `internal-only`)
Domain & DTOs	Field-level annotations for masking and policy enforcement
Persistence	Transparent encryption at rest; tenant-scoped secrets or keys
Transit	All traffic uses mTLS or HTTPS with tenant-bound claims
Logging	Sensitive fields masked or excluded from logs entirely
API exposure	OpenAPI excludes or redacts PII unless explicitly exposed

📘 Blueprint Example: Sensitive Field Declaration¶

fields:
  - name: customerEmail
    type: string
    sensitivity: pii
    mask: partial
  - name: accessToken
    type: string
    sensitivity: secret
    mask: full
  - name: internalNote
    type: string
    sensitivity: internal-only

→ Used by agents to determine:

Logging policy
Encryption requirement
API exposure
Storage behavior (e.g., KMS or Vault wrapping)

🛡️ PII Handling in Generated Code¶

Policy	Behavior
`pii`	Logged only if `mask` is applied; stored encrypted if persistent
`secret`	Never logged; stored in secret store; masked in all traces
`internal-only`	Not returned from public APIs; excluded from external event payloads
`mask: partial`	Logs show `user@****.com` or similar patterns
`mask: full`	Logs show `*REDACTED*` or `null` value

🤖 Agent Responsibilities¶

Agent	Skills
`Domain Modeler Agent`	`AnnotateSensitiveFields`, `EmitFieldMaskingMetadata`
`Backend Developer Agent`	`ApplyEncryptionPolicy`, `InjectPIIMaskingInLogs`
`Security Architect Agent`	`ValidateDataProtectionPolicy`, `ScanForPIILeaks`
`Test Generator Agent`	`EmitRedactionTest`, `AssertPIIIsMaskedInOutput`

🔐 Encryption Practices¶

At rest:
DB fields use column-level encryption or envelope encryption via KMS
Backups encrypted per tenant with separate keys
In transit:
All APIs and message queues are TLS or mTLS protected
Event payloads redact sensitive values unless destination is trusted
In memory:
Access tokens and secrets held in transient scope; wiped after use
Agents may encrypt prompts with sensitive inputs using transient envelope keys

🧪 Test Coverage¶

Assert redaction in logs
Validate no sensitive field appears in serialized DTOs exposed via public API
Encrypt-decrypt round-trip for storage layer
Event inspection to ensure sensitive values not emitted in untrusted flows

📊 Studio Data Protection Panel¶

View field sensitivity graph (per module)
Masking policy visualizer
Log scan results for redaction failures
Data access trace map (who accessed which PII field and when)
Event payload scanner and redaction validator

✅ Summary¶

ConnectSoft enforces structured data protection for all sensitive fields, including PII, secrets, and internal-only metadata
Fields are declared as sensitive in blueprints and handled securely across the entire software lifecycle
This ensures platform-wide compliance with GDPR, HIPAA, SOC2, and supports trust-by-design engineering

⚖️ Compliance Guardrails (HIPAA/GDPR/SOC2 Triggers)¶

ConnectSoft includes built-in compliance enforcement mechanisms that align with frameworks like HIPAA, GDPR, SOC 2, and others. Rather than relying on manual audits, the platform uses automated compliance triggers, policy validators, and blueprint annotations to ensure every generated artifact adheres to required standards.

“Compliance isn’t a report we generate — it’s a guardrail that agents follow.”

This section details how compliance guardrails are embedded into generation flows, how violations are caught, and how audit-readiness is achieved by default.

🧠 Key Compliance Domains Covered¶

Domain	Examples of Guardrails
Data protection (GDPR, HIPAA)	PII classification, masking, access audit trails
Access control (SOC 2)	RBAC, scoped permissions, MFA required for admins
Infrastructure security	Hardened deployments, firewall rules, network isolation
Event & audit logging	Traceability of all privileged actions, immutable logs
Retention and right to erasure (GDPR)	Data deletion flows, retention config in blueprints
Secrets & credentials	Key rotation, vault usage, zero-secrets-in-code enforcement
Encryption	TLS/mTLS in transit, KMS at rest, tenant-isolated keys

📘 Blueprint Compliance Block Example¶

compliance:
  required: [gdpr, soc2]
  dataPolicy:
    retentionDays: 730
    erasureRequestEnabled: true
  auditTrail:
    emitSecurityEvents: true
    immutability: true

→ Enforced by:

Code generation policies
Infra and K8s annotations
Security event emission
Agent orchestration policy engine

🧩 Examples of Compliance Guardrails in Action¶

Trigger	Guardrail
Field marked `pii`, but no masking policy	❌ Blueprint rejected: `MissingPIIMaskingRule`
Public API lacks `scope` or `auth` field	❌ API blocked from deployment
Service missing audit trail emitter	❌ Release gated with `ComplianceTestFailed`
No retention policy defined for personal data	⚠️ Warning in Studio + validation failed in CI
Deployment uses `latest` image tag	❌ SOC 2 violation: `UnversionedImage` blocked in pipeline

✅ Guardrails are enforced by validators, orchestrators, and Studio policies.

🤖 Agent Skills Supporting Compliance¶

Agent	Skills
`Security Architect Agent`	`EnforceCompliancePolicy`, `ScanBlueprintForViolations`, `EmitComplianceScore`
`DevOps Engineer Agent`	`ValidatePipelineForSOC2`, `AttachComplianceMetadataToRelease`
`Test Generator Agent`	`EmitComplianceTests`, `AssertRetentionAndRedactionFlows`
`Documentation Writer Agent`	`GenerateComplianceAppendix`, `EmitAuditMap`

📦 Generated Artifacts¶

compliance-report.json
release-metadata.yaml with compliance section
security-events.ndjson (signed audit log)
pii-map.yaml and retention-config.yaml

📊 Studio Compliance Dashboard¶

Compliance coverage per module and tenant
Guardrail violation history
Policy diff viewer (current vs required)
Exportable SOC2-Audit-Bundle.zip or GDPR-Field-Access-Report.json
Real-time status badges on every module page (✅/⚠️/❌)

🧪 Validation & CI Integration¶

Policy-as-code in CI via conftest, rego, or custom validator
Lint rules: NoUnscopedPublicAPI, MustEmitTraceForRoleChange, FieldWithoutMasking
Compliance test mode in orchestrator (--validate-compliance-only)
Fail gates for non-conformant images, packages, or endpoints

✅ Summary¶

Compliance in ConnectSoft is automated, traceable, and enforced through guardrails at every phase of generation, deployment, and execution
Support is built-in for HIPAA, GDPR, SOC2, and others, using policy validators, agent enforcement, and CI/CD hooks
This makes ConnectSoft audit-ready by default, reducing risk and increasing trust across clients and industries

🧾 Policy-as-Code Enforcement (OPA/Conftest/Rego)¶

ConnectSoft integrates Policy-as-Code (PaC) mechanisms to enforce security, compliance, and architectural governance throughout the entire lifecycle — from blueprint submission to runtime deployment. These policies are written in declarative formats like Rego and validated via tools like OPA (Open Policy Agent) and Conftest during code generation and CI/CD.

“If it’s not allowed by policy, it won’t even be generated.”

This section explores how ConnectSoft uses PaC to validate blueprint intent, block unsafe constructs, and enforce standards with consistency and automation.

🧠 Why Policy-as-Code Is Essential¶

Benefit	Impact
✅ Enforce security at generation time	Block unsafe blueprints before artifacts are produced
✅ Reproducible, testable policies	Policy changes can be reviewed and versioned like code
✅ Environment-specific policies	Staging ≠ Production; policies can vary by target
✅ Developer feedback loop	Studio, CI, and agent orchestration return actionable errors
✅ Reduce human review overhead	Removes need for manual compliance and security reviews

📘 Example Policy (Rego): Block Public APIs Without Auth¶

package connectsoft.api

deny[msg] {
  input.api.public == true
  not input.api.auth
  msg := "Public APIs must declare an auth strategy"
}

→ Used by conftest during blueprint pre-validation to block unsafe configurations.

📋 Blueprint Policy Flow¶

flowchart TD
  Blueprint --> ConftestValidator
  ConftestValidator -->|Policy Check| PassOrFail
  PassOrFail -->|Fail| StudioLinter
  StudioLinter -->|Error Reported| DeveloperFeedback

Hold "Alt" / "Option" to enable pan & zoom

✅ All blueprint changes are scanned for policy violations before agent orchestration.

🔐 Policy Categories Enforced¶

Policy Area	Example
Security	`Secrets must not be hardcoded`, `Services must run as non-root`
Compliance	`PII fields must have masking`, `Retention policy required for GDPR`
Architecture	`Microservices must use message-based integration`, `No monoliths allowed`
Release	`Image must be versioned`, `Blueprint must pass tests before promotion`
Cost Control	`Max replicas cannot exceed budget`, `Idle containers must scale to 0`

🤖 Agent Support for PaC¶

Agent	Skills
`Security Architect Agent`	`EmitRegoPolicies`, `AttachPolicyToBlueprint`, `ValidateWithOPA`
`DevOps Engineer Agent`	`InjectConftestStageIntoPipeline`, `EmitPolicyViolationEvents`
`Orchestrator Agent`	`BlockExecutionOnPolicyFail`, `LogPolicyEvaluations`
`QA Agent`	`GeneratePolicyTestCases`, `EmitPaCTestSuite`

📦 Artifacts and CI/CD Integration¶

policies/ folder generated per module or project
conftest integrated into CI pipeline (conftest test blueprints/)
opa-bundle.tar.gz versioned and published for Studio to load dynamically
policy-report.json emitted per blueprint with severity breakdown

🧪 Studio and Pipeline Feedback¶

Studio displays:
Failed policy reason
Policy source file (with line numbers)
Suggested fix
CI integration:
conftest exit code fails build
GitHub/Azure DevOps comments show policy impact inline
Pipeline summary includes all passed/failed policies by category

📊 Studio Policy Enforcement View¶

Per-module compliance score (based on policy pass rate)
Policy coverage explorer (what’s enforced, where, why)
Policy exception request interface
Audit log of policy failures, who approved overrides, and when
Rego test runner for maintainers

✅ Summary¶

ConnectSoft treats organizational policies as code — integrated into agent execution, blueprint validation, CI/CD, and Studio workflows
Policies are written in Rego, evaluated using OPA or Conftest, and enforced automatically
This enables proactive, repeatable, and auditable security and compliance enforcement

🧪 Security Test Generation and Validation¶

In ConnectSoft, security isn’t just designed — it’s tested continuously. The platform automatically generates security test suites for all agent-generated services, blueprints, APIs, and infrastructure. These tests cover authorization, secrets handling, tenant isolation, encryption, redaction, and policy enforcement.

“If it’s not tested, it’s not trusted.”

This section explains how ConnectSoft integrates security validation as code — enforced through blueprints, CI pipelines, and agent execution flows.

🧠 What Gets Covered in Security Tests¶

Category	Examples
✅ Authorization	Access with/without required roles, tokens, scopes
✅ Authentication	Missing/expired/invalid tokens return `401`
✅ Role-based access	Test that unauthorized roles get `403`
✅ PII redaction	Sensitive fields never exposed in logs/responses
✅ Tenant boundaries	Cross-tenant data access attempts blocked
✅ Secrets protection	Secrets never appear in logs or responses
✅ Transport encryption	Services reject plaintext or insecure calls
✅ Infrastructure policy	Validate non-root execution, read-only FS, port exposure

📘 Blueprint Security Test Directive¶

securityTests:
  required:
    - authScopes
    - piiRedaction
    - roleAccess
    - tenantIsolation
  testModes:
    - runtime
    - api
    - ci-only

→ Triggers test generators and injects scenarios into CI pipelines.

🧩 Test Types Emitted¶

Test Type	Description
API auth tests	Simulates access with various tokens, scopes, roles
Security probe tests	Asserts `/healthz`, `/ready` endpoints do not leak secrets
Redaction tests	Validates logs or JSON responses exclude sensitive values
Policy enforcement tests	Simulates policy violations (e.g., missing mask) and expects rejections
Network tests	Validates mTLS handshake and port isolation using curl/prober

🤖 Agent Skills Involved¶

Agent	Skills
`Test Generator Agent`	`EmitSecurityTestSuite`, `GenerateUnauthorizedAccessTests`, `InjectPolicyTests`
`QA Agent`	`AssertRoleEnforcement`, `VerifyRedactionInLogs`, `ValidateTokenScopes`
`Security Architect Agent`	`PlanCoverageForSecurity`, `EmitPIIComplianceTestPlan`
`DevOps Engineer Agent`	`InsertSecurityTestsIntoPipeline`, `RunInfraComplianceChecks`

🧪 Test Artifacts Emitted¶

SecurityTests.cs or .feature file (SpecFlow, Postman, etc.)
redaction-checks.json for logs and events
unauthorized-access-tests.http (for REST-based flows)
security-coverage-report.json
assertions.yaml for infrastructure scanning

📊 Studio Security Test Dashboard¶

Coverage per module: auth, masking, isolation, token flows
Failed test trace viewer with linked blueprint section
Enforcement status for each security category
Delta viewer (what test cases changed from previous build)
Risk-weighted test gaps: e.g., “high-risk API has no redaction test”

✅ Pipeline Integration¶

Tests injected as CI stages (e.g., security-tests, infra-validation, auth-checks)
failOnSecurityGap: true policy supported in release workflow
Security tests run in both pre-release and post-deploy smoke modes
Exportable report: SecurityTestResults.json, TestRunAudit.ndjson

✅ Summary¶

ConnectSoft automatically generates and runs comprehensive security tests for all artifacts, modules, and flows
These tests cover authorization, isolation, secrets, transport, policy compliance, and are fully agent-driven
This guarantees that every release is verified for security — not just assumed

🚀 Secure Delivery & Deployment Pipelines¶

ConnectSoft enforces secure software delivery practices across its CI/CD workflows. Every pipeline is built to be tamper-resistant, identity-scoped, artifact-signed, and policy-controlled. Deployments only proceed if all security validations pass, and every action is traceable by identity, environment, and module.

“The pipeline is part of the perimeter — and it’s locked down by design.”

This section explains how ConnectSoft guarantees that only trusted, tested, and signed artifacts are released into runtime environments.

🧠 Pillars of Secure Delivery¶

Principle	Implementation
✅ Signed commits and artifacts	Build output includes cryptographic signatures and hash digests
✅ Identity-scoped pipelines	Each job runs under a workload identity with scoped permissions
✅ Blueprint validation gating	No deploy if blueprint fails compliance or policy checks
✅ Deployment audit trails	Every release emits traceable `DeploymentEvent`
✅ Immutable releases	Images are pinned by digest; tag drift is blocked
✅ Approval and role enforcement	Promotions require role-based signoff (e.g., `security-architect`)

📘 Example: Secure CI/CD Flow Configuration¶

ciPipeline:
  validate:
    - securityTests
    - policy-as-code
    - artifact-signature
  sign:
    enabled: true
    gpgKey: connectsoft-release
  release:
    environments:
      - staging
      - production
    approvalRequiredFor: [production]
    onlyIfCompliant: true

→ Enforced via GitOps-compatible workflows, Azure DevOps, GitHub Actions, or equivalent.

🔐 Delivery Controls at Each Stage¶

Stage	Enforcement
Pre-build	Blueprint validated for security policies (OPA, Conftest)
Build	Image signed, SBOM generated, CVE scan applied
Test	Security tests injected (`401`, `403`, redaction, probe)
Release Plan	Signed `release.yaml` emitted with version, hash, and compliance notes
Approval	Role-scoped reviewers approve promotion to production
Deploy	Runtime config validated, secrets injected securely
Post-deploy	Health checks, probe validation, log anomaly detection

🤖 Agent Responsibilities¶

Agent	Skills
`DevOps Engineer Agent`	`EmitSignedReleaseYaml`, `InjectSecurePipelineStage`, `ValidatePromotionPolicy`
`Security Architect Agent`	`BlockInsecureRelease`, `CheckSBOMCompliance`, `EnforceImageDigestPinning`
`Studio Coordinator Agent`	`EmitDeploymentEvent`, `AttachTraceToPipeline`, `LogEnvironmentTransition`

📦 Emitted Artifacts¶

release.yaml with digest, traceId, signer, policy score
sbom.json with hash chain and license data
signature.asc for images or binaries
compliance-report.json linked to traceId
promotion-approval-log.ndjson for audit

📊 Studio Release Control Panel¶

Deployment queue with gating status (approved, pending, blocked)
Compliance score and signed-by info
Rollback tools linked to immutable image/version
Secure delivery log (who, what, where, when)
Artifact fingerprint visualizer: hash chain → release → deployment

🧪 Pipeline Hardening Tests¶

Reject tag-based deployment if digest isn’t pinned
Inject invalid token → test access control and failure
Rebuild binary → signature mismatch check
Replay release with wrong trace → pipeline blocked

✅ Summary¶

ConnectSoft CI/CD pipelines are secure by design: identity-bound, policy-enforced, and signature-validated
Every deployment is audited, compliant, and traceable
No release can be promoted unless it passes all security gates and matches an approved blueprint trace

🚫 Security Anti-Patterns to Avoid¶

Even with strong architectural guardrails, it's critical to recognize and block security anti-patterns that can arise in blueprint design, agent skills, infrastructure, or runtime configuration. ConnectSoft’s platform proactively detects, prevents, and flags these dangerous patterns — ensuring secure defaults and safe overrides.

“If it compromises isolation, observability, or integrity — it’s rejected before it runs.”

This section outlines high-risk behaviors ConnectSoft explicitly prevents using agent constraints, code generation rules, policy checks, and Studio alerts.

🧩 Common Security Anti-Patterns¶

Anti-Pattern	Risk	Mitigation
🔓 Hardcoded secrets in code or YAML	Secret exposure	Enforced secret injection from vault; scanned by blueprint validator
🧪 Exposing `/healthz` or internal diagnostics in public APIs	Attack surface expansion	Gateway blocks unauthenticated access; agent linter flags
📦 Tag-based container deployments (`latest`)	Supply chain drift, rollback failure	Image digests enforced in CI/CD
👤 Missing or invalid `tenantId` in handlers or routes	Cross-tenant data leakage	Agent skill scope validation + execution metadata check
🚪 Unscoped public APIs without OAuth2	Open attack vector	Policy-as-code enforcement and OpenAPI security schema required
🗂️ PII fields without masking rules	Compliance violations (e.g., GDPR, HIPAA)	Blueprint validation fails without `mask` or `redact: true`
📄 Unsigned build artifacts or config drifts	Tampering risk	Build signing and release hash comparison required
👑 Overprivileged agents or users	Role escalation	RBAC enforcement + `RoleEscalationAttempt` event logging
🌐 Unrestricted egress from containers	Exfiltration channel	Default deny egress policy unless declared in blueprint
🧱 Running containers as root	Escalation on pod escape	Templates enforce `runAsNonRoot: true` + CI linter validation

🧪 Detection Mechanisms¶

Source	Detection
Blueprint Linter	Fails build if high-risk configuration is declared
Agent Orchestrator	Prevents execution of forbidden skill-context pairs
Policy-as-Code (OPA/Conftest)	Blocks insecure route exposure, tag usage, missing PII annotations
Studio Security Scanner	Highlights dangerous defaults or unreviewed deltas
Release Pipeline Validator	Rejects unsigned artifacts, missing trace metadata, or unaudited secrets

📘 Example: Detected Anti-Pattern¶

api:
  public: true
  auth: false

❌ Blocked With:

Public API endpoints must require authentication. Declare an auth strategy (e.g., OAuth2) or set 'public: false'.

🤖 Agents That Prevent Anti-Patterns¶

Agent	Skill
`Security Architect Agent`	`DetectUnscopedFieldAccess`, `BlockRootContainers`, `FlagMissingScope`
`QA Agent`	`EmitRedactionTests`, `VerifyHealthzExposure`, `AssertTenantBoundaries`
`DevOps Engineer Agent`	`RejectUntaggedRelease`, `ValidateImageSignature`, `ScanBuildConfig`
`Orchestrator Agent`	`AbortExecutionIfPolicyFailed`, `EmitAntiPatternViolationEvent`

📊 Studio Anti-Pattern Visuals¶

Violation heatmap per module
Historical trends of most frequent violations
Blueprint delta vs last known secure state
Risk weight scoring per artifact (SecurityRiskScore)
Violation-to-policy link for fast remediation

✅ Summary¶

ConnectSoft proactively detects and blocks dangerous security anti-patterns before they enter production
Anti-pattern prevention is enforced via agent constraints, template scaffolding, blueprint validation, and CI/CD gates
This ensures that even under scale, velocity, and autonomy — the system remains secure by construction

✅ Summary and Secure-by-Design Rules¶

The Security-First Architecture in ConnectSoft is not layered on top of software — it is embedded at every level, from blueprint input to runtime behavior. Over these 20 cycles, we’ve explored how ConnectSoft ensures every module, agent, and service is secure-by-construction, auditable, and compliant by default.

“Security isn’t a checkbox — it’s a constraint the entire factory respects.”

This final section recaps key concepts and delivers a comprehensive security checklist that ConnectSoft applies to every generated asset.

🔐 Security Principles Recap¶

Area	Key Mechanism
Identity & IAM	All actions are scoped by `agentId`, `userId`, `traceId`, and role-based policies
Zero Trust	mTLS, service mesh, and identity-aware communication at every layer
Tenant Isolation	Enforced via execution context, infrastructure segmentation, and trace-scoped artifacts
API Security	OAuth2, token scopes, claims-based authorization, OpenAPI validation
Secrets	Vault-managed, injected at runtime, never stored or logged
Runtime Hardening	Non-root, read-only filesystem, minimal base images, restricted egress
Supply Chain	Lockfiles, SBOMs, signed builds, dependency policies
Data Protection	PII classification, encryption, masking, and redaction enforced automatically
Compliance	SOC2, HIPAA, GDPR triggers and reporting integrated into CI, Studio, and agents
Policy Enforcement	OPA/Rego/Conftest guardrails at codegen, validation, and delivery stages
Security Testing	Auth, redaction, access, role enforcement tests emitted and verified
Audit Trails	Every action emits a traceable, signed `SecurityEvent` for compliance and investigation

📋 Secure-by-Design Checklist¶

🛡️ Blueprint Level¶

All public APIs declare auth & scopes
All sensitive fields tagged with sensitivity metadata
All tenant-aware flows declare tenantId and isolation boundary
Required compliance tags (gdpr, hipaa) declared

🔐 Agent & Skill Scope¶

Every agent skill maps to a trace-constrained, role-approved execution context
No agent can emit skills beyond its registered abilities

🔑 Secrets & Config¶

Secrets injected from provider (Vault, Key Vault, AWS SM)
No hardcoded passwords, tokens, or config in source or images
Rotation policy declared and enforced

🚀 CI/CD & Runtime¶

Pipeline runs with signed identities, scoped permissions
Image digest is pinned — no :latest allowed
All deployments are versioned, signed, and immutable

🧱 Infrastructure¶

All pods run as non-root
Read-only root filesystem by default
Egress restricted by policy
Liveness/readiness probes required for health & scaling

📊 Observability & Audit¶

All privileged actions emit signed SecurityEvent
Logs redact PII and secrets
Studio shows audit map by agent, role, and environment

⚖️ Compliance¶

SBOM present and license scan clean
Policy-as-code executed per environment
Exportable SOC2/GDPR audit bundles available

✅ Final Thought¶

“Security-First is not a document — it’s how the factory thinks.”

In ConnectSoft, security is not gated by reviews, slow audits, or reactive scanning. It’s enforced by:

✅ Templates
✅ Agent skill restrictions
✅ Blueprint validations
✅ Runtime constraints
✅ Observability and feedback

All combined to make software that is secure, scalable, and trustworthy by default.